UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24987
18 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling the obligations of Member States under the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming its resolutions 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989), 641 (1989), 681 (1990), 694 (1991) and 726 (1992),

Having learned with deep concern that Israel, the occupying Power, in contravention of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, deported to Lebanon on 17 December 1992, hundreds of Palestinian civilians from the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

1. Strongly condemns the action taken by Israel, the occupying Power, to deport hundreds of Palestinian civilians, and expresses its firm opposition to any such deportation by Israel;

2. Reaffirms the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and affirms that deportation of civilians constitutes a contravention of its obligations under the Convention;

3. Reaffirms also the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon;

4. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied territories of all those deported;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to consider dispatching a representative to the area to follow up with the Israeli Government with regard to this serious situation and to report to the Security Council;

6. Decides to keep the matter actively under review.

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17 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991), the attached third semi-annual report on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Annex

Letter dated 14 December 1992 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

United Nations Security Council resolution 699 (1991) approved on 17 June 1991, requests - inter alia - the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council progress reports on the implementation of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). Such reports are to be submitted every six months after the adoption of the resolution and the third report is therefore due on 17 December 1992.

Please find attached an outline of the activities carried out by the Agency during the past six months under the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, that you might find useful for the preparation of your report.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

Third semi-annual report (covering the period 17 June 1992 - 17 December 1992) on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

INTRODUCTION

By resolution 699 of 17 June 1991, the Security Council approved the plan submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through the Secretary-General for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all items listed in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Resolution 699 also called for the Secretary-General to submit every six months a progress report on the implementation of the plan.

The first of these reports was circulated by the Secretary-General to the members of the Security Council in document S/23295 dated 17 December 1991, and the second in document S/24110 dated 17 June 1992.

This is the third semi-annual report of the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for destruction, removal or rendering harmless covering the period from 17 June 1992 to 17 December 1992.

PRESENT STATUS

As recently reported by the Director General in his address to the Security Council, the IAEA has carried out, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, 16 missions in Iraq, which have entailed inspections at more than seventy sites and have resulted in the gradual disclosure of a broadly-based nuclear programme aimed at the production of enriched uranium and at the development of nuclear weapon capabilities. As a result of these inspections, in the course of which the IAEA has interviewed numerous Iraqi authorities and secured thousands of pages of documents, the IAEA has been able to draw a reasonably coherent and consistent picture of Iraq's nuclear programme. However, doubts remain as to whether the picture is complete.

Efforts to implement the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of all items referred to in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) are on-going. The IAEA has supervised extensive destruction of facilities and equipment related to the production of enriched uranium and to the weaponization programme. Key buildings and equipment have been demolished by Iraqi personnel at the direction of the IAEA inspection teams, resulting in the destruction of the Al Atheer, Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites. All nuclear-related production facilities at Al Jezira and Al Qaim were destroyed during the Gulf War and the Tuwaitha Centre was badly damaged. With regard to nuclear-weapons-usable material, the only such material currently known to remain in Iraq is the highly enriched uranium in irradiated reactor fuel assemblies, removal of which from Iraq awaits conclusion of the necessary arrangements with recipient countries. The material has been verified and is being kept under seal until its removal. In addition, numerous other materials, equipment and components have been either destroyed, removed from Iraq or placed under Agency seal in Iraq and are subjected to regular verification. The details of the activities relevant to destruction, removal or rendering harmless carried out since the second report was submitted by the Director General are set out below.

Direct-Use Material

Fresh fuel

As indicated in the second report, all of the fresh fuel for the IRT 5000 reactor has been transferred to Russia and transformed, through isotopic dilution, into uranium enriched to slightly less than 20% in U235. This material has been transferred from the processing plant to a storage facility in Russia, pending its resale, where it will remain under IAEA safeguards. The French-origin MTR type plates and the Russian-origin pins which were removed from Iraq in June 1992 remain in storage at the IAEA laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria.

Irradiated fuel

As indicated in the second report, negotiations with a consortium of commercial companies from France and the UK for the removal, transportation and disposal of this fuel had met with difficulties of a legal, technical and financial nature. Therefore, the IAEA issued on 27 November 1992 a new request for proposals for the removal, transportation and disposal of the material in question. In the course of the recently-completed Fifteenth IAEA inspection, a group of experts identified the operational requirements for removal of the irradiated fuel from Iraq. From their review of the situation, it can be concluded that all fuel assemblies are now accessible and can be removed without major difficulties, and that substantial involvement of Iraqi personnel will be necessary. The estimated time for removal is 4 to 6 months once the operation is begun. It is hoped that the removal operation will begin in the first half of 1993.

Plutonium and Other Nuclear Material

The IAEA continued to pursue its inquiry into inconsistencies in the Iraqi nuclear material flow declarations, in particular with regard to activities said by the Iraqi authorities to have taken place in the building 73 complex at the Al Tuwaitha site. Further discussions have been held with Iraqi personnel on this issue, and additional samples have been taken of the filters, declared feed materials and building 73 waste.

Installations, equipment and other materials relevant to enriched uranium production

In the course of the recently-completed Sixteenth IAEA inspection, Iraqi authorities indicated that they would respond positively to requests for procurement-related data. If complied with, this would help to break the impasse that has developed with respect to the provision of such information.

The approximately 96 tonnes of 350-grade maraging steel presented and verified at Iskandariya was transferred to Basra and has been melted and diluted with equal amounts of high carbon steel in the furnaces at Basra. The resulting mixture has been sampled and verified. Analysis of the samples indicates that the operation has succeeded in rendering the maraging steel harmless.

The completion of the destruction of the Electro Magnetic Isotopic Separation (EMIS) sites at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat was verified by the Fourteenth IAEA Inspection Team. At Tarmiya, all of the EMIS production buildings and associated electrical power distribution capability have been destroyed. The electrical power to the site has been reduced by a factor of three. Further reductions in delivered power will depend on an evaluation of the Iraqi proposals for an alternative use of the site. At Ash Sharqat, all EMIS production and associated electrical production distribution facilities have also been destroyed. The electric sub-station supplying power to the site was verified as having been completely dismantled. EMIS components consistent with Iraqi declarations and independently-acquired procurement data have been verified as destroyed.

The R24 EMIS experimental system, a 1 to 5 scale model of the 1200 mm system built to study the separators magnetic field, was destroyed by Iraqi personnel at the direction of the Fifteenth Inspection Team. The items comprising the system included nine double pole magnets, the winding machine and the transport rails for the winding machine.

Installations and equipment relevant to weaponization activities

The Al Atheer/Hatteen sites have been re-inspected since completion of the destruction of the weaponization-related facilities and equipment located at the sites. At the invitation of the Iraqi authorities, the Fifteenth IAEA Inspection Team saw five Hadland CCD cameras which had been declared to an UNSCOM missile team a year ago. The cameras and associated accessories were inventoried and the details are being evaluated with respect to the camera's utility for high explosives testing.

Approximately 250 tonnes of HMX, a high-melting point explosive, is currently stored under Agency seal at Al Qa Qaa pending a determination concerning its disposition.

FUTURE ACTIONS

As indicated above, arrangements remain to be made for the removal from Iraq of a quantity of U235 contained in irradiated fuel elements. Priority should be given to concluding this action as promptly as possible out of safety considerations.

The IAEA has identified and inventoried approximately 700 machine tools. Some of these machine tools meet the specifications for Annex 3 (revised) of the IAEA plan for future ongoing monitoring of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. Disposition of these items is under consideration.

As indicated in the IAEA's second report on these activities, additional destruction, removal or rendering harmless may be necessary.

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LETTER DATED 17 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to set out the position of Iraq on an important matter relating to decision 10, contained in document S/AC.26/1992/10 and adopted by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission at its 27th meeting on 26 June 1992, by which the Council approved the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure.

On 2 May 1991, the Secretary-General submitted his report on the subject of compensation (S/22559) pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Section II of that report and, more specifically, paragraph 26 stress that Iraq will be informed of all claims and will have the right to present its comments to the commissioners within time-delays to be fixed by the Governing Council or the Panel dealing with the individual claim.

In paragraph 5 of its resolution 692 (1991), the Security Council directed the Governing Council to proceed in an expeditious manner to implement the provisions of section E of resolution 687 (1991), taking into account the recommendations in section II of the Secretary-General's report (S/22559), including paragraph 26, as mentioned above.

In fact, however, the Governing Council has not taken account of these recommendations, contrary to the instructions contained in Security Council resolution 692 (1991), and has instead adopted a procedure whereby a copy of the report of the Executive Secretary of the Compensation Commission is sent to all Governments and international organizations, including Iraq; the Government of Iraq, other Governments and international organizations are then entitled to present their views within 30 days in the case of claims in categories A, B and C, or within 90 days in the case of other claims, although the report does not provide any details about the claims which would make it possible to present such views.

The adoption of this procedure by the Governing Council, together with its failure to follow the recommendations of the Secretary-General, as adopted by the Security Council, have made it impossible for Iraq to acquaint itself with the details of claims and so deprived it of its entitlement to comment and present its views in that connection. Those details are, however,

available to the Governments submitting the claims and to the secretariat of the Commission. By its decision 10, the Council has thus denied Iraq its legal and logical right, despite the fact that Iraq is the only party of crucial importance with respect to the payment of compensation.

The Governing Council's disregard for the aforementioned recommendations of the Secretary-General is highlighted by the contents of the first report of the Executive Secretary of the Compensation Commission, dated 30 October 1992. The report provides numbers without any explanation or details, giving the number of individual claims as 65,693, as well as 42 consolidated claims filed by 18 Governments, together with the names of the States concerned and the amounts sought by category. Neither does the report provide any information which could be verified by Iraq, any views or comments, or even the names and nationalities of claimants. It is obviously impossible to comment on a report of this nature or to check the claims listed therein. What the Governing Council should be striving to do is to use all available means to verify the accuracy of claims submitted, with a view to avoiding fraud and duplication, and to provide Iraq with information and supporting documentation relating to the claims; this would undoubtedly help the Commissioners to establish the truth, as recommended in the report of the Secretary-General.

In light of the above, the Government of the Republic of Iraq believes that decision 10 of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission and the report of the Executive Secretary to the Governing Council are essentially incompatible with the principles of justice and equity and with the provisions of Security Council resolution 692 (1991).

Accordingly, the Government of the Republic of Iraq calls on the Security Council to take whatever measures it deems appropriate to correct the situation in such a way as to ensure compliance with the relevant instructions of the Council.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/24990
20 December 1992
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace for the purpose of surveillance and provocation during the period from 8 to 15 December 1992, as follows.

8-9 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 25 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 2,000-7,000 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 22 sorties, flown by F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-9,000 m, centred over Amarah, Samawah, Nasiriyah, Shatrah, Salman, Jaliba and Busayyah.

9-10 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 18 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Amadiyah and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 27 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 700-800 km/h and at altitudes of 6,500-8,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Shatrah, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

10-11 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 21 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-18,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah, Tall Afar and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 31 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 4,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Qal'at Salih, Samawah, Busayyah, Salman, Artawi and Ushbayjah.

From 1158 to 1433 hours on 11 December 1992, a United States TR-1 aircraft engaged in hostile aerial reconnaissance of the southern region from an altitude of 20,000 m.

11-12 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 2,500-10,000 m, centred on Mosul, Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah and Dukan.

On 12 December 1992, a two-aircraft formation dropped heat flares on the Mosul area from a medium altitude.

(b) Southern area: No aerial activity was recorded in the above-mentioned region on this day.

12-13 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah and Tall Afar.

On 13 December 1992, a two-aircraft formation dropped heat flares on the Fayidah area, Ninawa governorate, from a medium altitude.

(b) Southern region: 32 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 m, centred on Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman and Artawi.

From 1220 to 1428 hours on 13 December 1992, a United States TR-1 aircraft engaged in hostile aerial reconnaissance of the southern region from an altitude of 20,000 m.

13-14 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-8,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern area: No aerial activity was recorded in the above-mentioned region on this day.

14-15 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 12 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-10,000 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 4,000-9,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Jalibah, Artawi and Qurnah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 97 (c)
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS:
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND
REPORTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS
AND REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 18 December 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the following documents:

(a) Depositions of Serbian women given to the State Commission for War Crimes (see annex I);

(b) Analysis of the medical-psychological examinations of one group of people released through the exchange of prisoners (see annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and those documents circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 97 (c), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX I

Depositions of Serbian women given to the State Commission for War Crimes

Rapings

The exchanged women confirmed rumours of the abuse of women and children who were ethnic hostages in Novi Grad. "Eight men came one night around 11 p.m.", said one of the exchanged women. "They were half drunk and they beat us all. They took out two girls, L. D. (15) and S. D. (21), and raped them both.

"It was a group of some 10 boys from Posavska Mahala and the surrounding villages who called themselves 'horses of fire'. I knew most of them personally. In particular, Marijan Brnic. I implored, I begged him to let me go, reminding him of his past neighbourly relations with my family. He told me to be glad that he was alone since the procedure was different with others, five or six on one girl. They pulled my friend B. N. (19) by the hair, beat her and put a knife to her throat when she tried to break free. She was raped by two of the group. The rest were dispersed by police. When they were detained by their own police to prevent them from molesting us again, all of Posavska Mahala was on its feet. They threatened to come and set fire to all of us and Novi Grad if the boys were not released. Police let them go. The rapings continued", says Z. M. (22), one of the raped girls.

"They came at night, half intoxicated, some of them even drugged. They put women onto trucks and took them away, returning them at sunrise, naked and tormented. They also took women who had small children. Some of the women who could not muster courage to get out of the forest in which they were raped" describe their pain, women who wanted by stay anonymous but who are ready to witness in a court of law. A 10-year-old girl, M. L., was raped in Novi Grad. This grave crime was committed by Mate Burugdzic from the village of Pecnik. "I was taken away half an hour past midnight. There were six of them. I was abused and treated foully by all of them. They told me: 'You have to give birth to a little Ustasha!'. For days thereafter I roamed around like mad hiding in the forest", says ...P. from Novi Grad.

Bretelj Detention Camp, Capljina

In an article published in the Slobodno Nevesinje newspaper (No. 6 of 20 September 1992), a witness to the Bretelj hell confirmed rumours about the raping of Serb women and girls. "Women who were not so many in the camp as men were subjected to brutal torture and humiliated. I can say that they were raped in front of their other inmates, even their detained relatives. That was awful."

The Tarcin area

Physical torture to which Serbs from this area have been subjected by Muslims is particularly brutal. Serb women are charged with possession of radio stations and keeping of war journals. They are arrested on these charges and physically and mentally abused and humiliated. A woman from the village of Ferhatlije, near Pazaric, committed suicide after such torture. Particularly notorious are Nijaz Lihovac called Tera, Mirsad Sabic called Mirso and Muhamed Turcinovic called Zeko, former police officer of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Extracts from the confession by Alija Selimagic of the crimes committed in the villages around Bosanski Brod with a facsimile of the part containing his signature

Rapings

Some three days thereafter I went with the same group of people to Sijekovac. Before we set off, Enes Havic and Becir Hodzic told us that we were going to abduct Serbian girls. We came to Sijekovac in a van and Havic's car. Once there, we started from the "Zidic" store and the bus station in direction of Derventa raiding houses. A number of girls, i.e. younger women, were raped in the houses in which they were found and, as far as I remember, 28 Serbian women were kidnapped and taken to Slavonski Brod in the van.

I was the first to break into a house with Enes Havic, Becir Hodzic and Sead Mujcin (Aga), where we found a man and a woman (both of about 50 years old) and their 23-year-old daughter. First, we tied her father and mother and then began to rape their daughter. I was the first to rape her, assisted by Becir Hodzic and Enes Havic. After me, she was raped by the other three and we raped her mother too. Thereafter, I cut her mother's throat and Enes Havic did the same to her father.

We took the girl to the van. Becir Hodzic drove the girl off while we continued raiding other houses. When Hodzic came back and rejoined the group, he told us that the van was crowded and that the girls had been driven to Slavonski Brod. When the van came back again, my group abducted six or seven more girls who, too, were driven to Slavonski Brod. I do not know their names or the families they belong to. Where we found the girls' parents or relatives, we tied and left them in their homes. I do not know if and how many relatives of the abducted girls the people from other groups killed. When the action was completed, Becir Hodzic told us that the girls were taken to Slavonski Brod and placed in the brothels to cater for the needs of the Croatian army. I remember very well that in the end I, Hodzic, Havic and Mujcin kidnapped a girl for each of us and took them to Gornje Kolibe. We kidnapped a Serbian girl, M. M., who worked at a shop in Gornje Kolibe and three Moslem girls, Z. J., J. C. and E. C. We caught them in the street. We took them to Kolibe in the van driven by Enes Havic. I took Z. J. to my home, where I held her for three or four days. At first, she refused to have intercourse with me and I threatened to kill her, whereupon she consented. Thereafter, I let her go home at her request.

Deposition made by J. I., a nurse from Brcko, of her own accord on 20 October 1992 at the Gynaecology-Obstetrics Clinic in Belgrade

On 12 January 1992, I was visiting my aunt in Germany, where I was spending the second half of my annual leave. I left Germany on 26 January. On 28 January we were stopped by police on the highway, a few kilometres away from Sisak; they checked our passports and six of us, four girls and two men, all young, were forced to step out. The driver was told to drive on. He complained and he was beaten and maltreated and eventually had to leave without us.

We were taken to the police station somewhere near Sisak, where we were split into two groups. One was sent to Slavonska Pozega and the other to Slavonski Brod. I was assigned to the group which went to Slavonski Brod.

When we arrived there, it was clear to all of us that it was a camp, that all kinds of atrocities were inflicted upon prisoners, but we were completely powerless. It was no use saying anything or protesting, since things could only get worse for us. We were left alone for two days.

After successful operations on the front, they came to us for rest and pleasure. That day I met many women from Kninska Krajina who were imprisoned, mistreated, tortured and some of them even disfigured. Some among them were very beautiful women. Younger women were put aside. Later on, we realized that they made it their purpose to increase the birth rate of Croatian children.

A group of younger women like myself were used for their pleasure and sometimes were brutalized.

One day, a group of newly arrived women, including myself, had a nightmarish experience. Five or six men on top of me and I blacked out. I could not believe it was happening to me and I could not remember anything until daybreak. After that experience, we were mistreated, abused and invariably raped day in and day out.

Sometimes they let us be for two or three days. When this happened, we were given no water, no food, no nothing. If food was given to us at all, it was so poor that not even animals would eat it.

I will remember a very striking, and very distressing for me, incident which occurred in Slavonski Brod and which is occasionally the cause of my bad dreams when I see their ugly faces.

One night, they came after midnight. They were very angry since they had to withdraw. We were placed in a hangar storing petrol barrels. We took

these barrels out as they were empty and had no use. So, we slept in them. Each of us was given only a thin blanket. I had nothing else on me except for the clothes they brought me in. All our belongings were taken away from us earlier.

That night they came to our hangar, they connected a few empty oil barrels and by taking one woman at a time, four of them molested her. My turn came. One tried to cut off my arm by axe. I still have a scar there, while the other was already inside me. A third one stabbed my leg and I fainted. They left me naked on these barrels all night. I was hungry, thirsty and terribly cold.

When they found out that many women were pregnant, myself included, they did not disturb us from time to time for the benefit of Croatian children. They had nothing against Serbian women bearing children by them, since fathers are Croats and therefore the children will be Croats too.

At that time, the oil refinery was on fire and we were also used as fire fighters. In this total chaos, I had been detained in Slavonski Brod since 28 January and was detained in the oil refinery till 22 April.

On the latter date, they transported us in trucks to the Sava river and therefrom to the other bank by boats. They moved us to the Odzak detention centre guarded by the joint forces of two nations: Croats and Muslims.

They knew that there were many pregnant women among us, so they grouped us in a building which used to be, as I heard, a school. At times, they dragged us to other buildings and used us as a shield against the attacking Serbian military units, i.e. "Krajisnici".

Many of us pregnant women were left alone, since our pregnancy was advanced (four or five months). I will now tell you what happened once.

After four or five hours of raping and torture in this school, they brought the imprisoned Serbs, young and old alike, ordering them to lick us after the obscene acts.

On last 16 July, the black legionaries or black shirts, whatever they called them, came asking us for any hidden money or gold as ransom which would save our lives. Until the very end we did not know what was going on and what made them act that way.

When I left Germany I had DM 800 on me. I hid DM 500 in the sole of my boot because of the customs and the rest of DM 300 were in my handbag, which was taken from me when I was arrested. They took all my belongings, so that during the whole period of my detention in the camp I was only in a blouse, a bodice, a denim jacket, a pair of blue jeans, one piece of underwear, one pair of stockings and boots.

The DM 500 I sewed in my jeans, so I had money to buy out my life.

We were taken out of the school one at a time. There was a man with a box sitting outside. Those who had nothing of value were lined up on one side and those who had some money on the other.

Those who had the money actually bailed themselves out and we were later exchanged. We had no idea that life was worth that much money you had in your pocket, or a ring or DM 50 or any other amount you had on you at the moment.

In Odzak we were received by the Krajina corps. That night they let us have a good sleep. We were given food, drink and cigarettes. It was the first time after six months that I drank juice and milk. I was a non-smoker for four years, but I lit a cigarette then. I could not believe my eyes and ears that I was free, that my head was still on my shoulders.

We were then sent to the hospital in Bosanski Samac. Once there, I asked to be sent to my hometown of Brcko, where I arrived on 18 July.

The following month I was treated in the Brcko hospital and I asked the doctors to terminate my five-and-a-half-month pregnancy.

But the doctor in Brcko was not for termination of my pregnancy because of my poor health. I had lost 30 kilos in five months. I had heart problems and my health improved somewhat after a month.

I heard nothing of my parents. I had a father, mother, a brother, sister-in-law and their children.

They all disappeared. I had no news of them. My friends from the "Srpska Biljenska Garda" tried to help me. They tried to trace the whereabouts of my parents, brother, sister-in-law and their children, but with no success. After a month's time, they helped me to visit my house, which was hit by three shells. I found some of my personal effects, which I packed into several bags. I also found out that my 74-year-old aunt was still alive and I called on her. I took over to her place my bare necessities. I also found some money at home and decided to visit my cousin in Belgrade.

She welcomed me and later left for Germany. So, I am presently alone in her apartment.

I went to see a doctor for advice on my health and pregnancy. Two doctors from Zemun recommended the Gynaecology-Obstetrics Clinic, where I was admitted in late August and early September. I previously contacted the Health Centre of Stari Grad Municipality, after which I was hospitalized here to see what could be done for me.

Thanks to Dr. Krstic, I am here today and thanks to all his fellow doctors I managed to find my peace of mind, if this is possible at all.

A baby girl was born and put up for adoption while I myself have to fight for my own life.

I found out that my parents are safe and sound and that they are somewhere around the town of Prijedor. My brother is on the front. So I have calmed down. But I still have no information about my sister-in-law and her children.

I will tell you about some other events.

In Slavonski Brod one man was called "Plavi", they all had nicknames and we had no idea what their real names were or where they came from.

His speciality was to burn down an eyebrow of a beautiful woman or to cut it out along its lines. He also liked to bite off a piece of ear or to gouge an eye. He did all of these things together or at least one of them.

There was a woman who came to Slavonski Brod camp in the seventh month of her pregnancy. They tore out her belly and took a live baby out of her womb.

Once, I don't know the reason why, something was stolen or someone was falsely accused, one soldier crushed the skull of a 40-year-old Serb by a rifle butt.

In Odzak, two Muslims circumcised all men without exception according to the Muslim ritual.

Many women had their finger cut off for a ring or their ears for ear rings.

Once I saw the lower lip of a very beautiful girl from Kninska Krajina being shredded by a man called "Crni" who previously raped and molested the girl. He enjoyed it.

We seldom saw other imprisoned men. We did not meet them often, and when we did they had visible marks of strangulation by metal wire, knife cuts on their necks, heads; some were with no eyes, or a hand, etc.

One, like an executioner, enjoyed to cut off a leg to the knee by axe, and let the bleeding men die.

There was a warehouse in Odzak where Serbs were imprisoned for 10 days with no water or food and left to urinate and empty there. They were mistreated and tortured day and night. Each night the bodies of two or three victims were removed to cover up the crimes.

Sometimes, they poured petrol on a cloth fixed to a stick and burned the skin of a naked man or woman. The more the victim screamed, the more they enjoyed it.

And another example. An 11-year-old girl, who was daily abused, had to serve them as a waitress completely naked.

This is all I can tell about myself and what happened to me. I find it very difficult to even bring myself to talk about this.

Belgrade, 20 October 1992

Deposition made by
J. I. (Signed)

Deposition taken by

Milena Vasiljevic
Senior Stenographer
at the Federal Assembly

Remark:

Gave birth to a baby girl who was put up for adoption.

THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE
WAR DEPARTMENT ILIDŽA

No. 810/92
Date: 5 October 1992
Processed by: A 15
PM.

OFFICIAL MEMO

Pursuant to a suggestion from the National Security Service, a deposition was taken from Nada Jovović which gravely incriminates Hamdo Šašić and three members of Juka's army for the rape and possible murder of Sanja Ikić in her flat at No. 1, Oteška Street.

Nada Jovović has also given a statement for television Belgrade and Novi Sad to their correspondent from Ilidža. That story, as well as a story on the rescue of Croats from Oteš, has been shelved until the rescue action is finished. This job was done in cooperation with military security bodies and the military police of the Ilidža brigade and a report thereon will be submitted on its completion.

Note: Nada Jovović's deposition is attached herewith.

(Signed) Srdjan ŠEHOVAC

/...

MINUTES

Citizen NADA JOVOVIĆ, born on 7 June 1969, father Novica and mother Dragica, nee Todorovic, agricultural technologist, single, permanent residence at No. 34 Darovalaca krvi Street, Sarajevo, commune of Novo Sarajevo, C.Reg. No. 0706969177668, has made the following statement.

On 30 September 1992, around 9 p.m., Hamdo Šašić, MP commander for the city of Sarajevo, accompanied by two members of "Juka's army", came to the apartment of Sanja Ikić at No. 1, Oteska Street, block 1. They asked me and Sanja Ikić what we had done at Joze Oroz's place, how had Stjepan Kalem, nicknamed Pepo, gone and why he had not taken us with him. They cursed our Četnik mothers and verbally abused us. Hamdo Šašić asked me where my brother and brother-in-law were. We did not respond to any of his provocations. At a certain point a third member of the so-called "Juka's army" arrived and addressed Hamdo Šašić with the words: "That is not how things are done, my brother, but like this". Having said that, this member of "Juka's army" took Sanja Ikić by the hand and took her to the adjoining room. The two other members of "Juka's army" joined them. After that I only heard screams and sounds of Sanja Ikić struggling to wrest herself free. I stayed in the room with Hamdo Šašić and, tearful and scared, asked him: "Why are you doing this to me when I am guilty of nothing". I begged him to go into the room and to make them let her go. He replied: "No, Nada, we must make Moslem children". At that moment one Juka's soldier entered the room buttoning up his black coveralls and said to Hamdo Šašić: "Our business is done". Three Juka's soldiers went towards the front door and I ran to the room in which my friend was. I found Sanja on the floor, naked, her body was red, especially her neck. Her face was white as a sheet and she was frothing at the mouth. I went to her and took her by the shoulders, I called her name, but she did not respond. I could not ascertain whether she was dead or alive. I ran towards the front door seeking to escape, but Hamdo Šašić caught up with me, grabbed my shoulder and turned me to face him.

Through tears I begged him to let me go but he would not let go of me. I started screaming and Hamdo hit me with his head, drawing blood from my nose and mouth. He lightly pushed me towards the floor. I fell on the floor and Hamdo Šašić said to me: "Tomorrow night you will be raped by me and you will bear a Moslem".

After that Hamdo took the key and locked the door from the outside, taking the key with him. Through the window of the flat, which was on the first floor above the "Hollywood" pizzeria, I climbed down to the street across some sandbags, then I ran to the other side of the street and went into building L near the railway track. There I spent the night and the next morning at 9 a.m. crossed the river Željeznica and into Vreoce.

Statement given by	Minutes kept by	Statement taken by
(Signed) JOVOVIĆ, Nada	(Signed) (illegible)	(Signed) (illegible)

/...

Deposition made by S. K. on 6 November 1992 at the Gynaecology-Obstetrics Clinic in Belgrade, 26 Visegradska Street

My name is S. K. I was born 11 July 1968, in Nisic, municipality of Ilijas.

I was captured on 26 May 1992 in the forest near my house. I was with two other refugee girls from Visoko - J. and N. R. We were captured by 10 men in camouflage uniforms; they had "lily" insignia on their caps. They put us in a truck and took off in an unknown direction. They drove us to Breza camp. We were detained in a basement with small windows; it was a dirty, damp and cold place. They raped us immediately on arrival; groups of them raped and beat us. I remained there two days.

I was then moved to another building, another room where there were five women and girls: two Nadas, Rosa, Mira and Olja. I was in that room until our release on 15 August 1992.

We were in the room almost all the time, except when we were taken out to watch prisoners being beaten up, tortured and executed. The torture consisted of slaughter, tearing of bodies bit by bit, drowning in a pool which looked like a swimming pool - what else was in it besides water, that I do not know.

Prisoners were forced to do hard labour and we were taken out from our room only to watch killings and tortures, or to clean and do the gardening. I did not know other prisoners; they were from Breza, Visoko and Vares.

We were repeatedly beaten and raped by scores of men; sometimes as many as 20 of them violated me one after the other. When we fainted, they poured water on us.

We did not have a bath. There was a bathroom but we were not allowed to have a bath or take a shower. There was a wash-basin where we could wash our faces, and if we managed we could wash ourselves speedily.

We were tortured simply by taking us to watch other prisoners being tortured. Once, they forced a father to rape his daughter who was about 17 years old. They beat them but both father and daughter refused to do what they were told. It was only when they pressed a knife to his throat that his daughter cried and begged him to do so in order not to be killed. He eventually did it and I do not know whether he was killed later on, but anyone who leaves that prison is a living death.

We were fed by pieces of mouldy bread or macaroni, probably leftovers, and a soup which was in fact slops.

We girls and women, occupying that room, could not talk to each other since we were never alone; there was always some one of them with us both when we worked and when we were in the room.

They constantly mentioned a name Kula, probably an alias. They kept asking themselves whether he would be satisfied by the way and how much they beat and raped us. They laughed as they did so.

Later on, when I returned home, I heard that Kula was the warden and that he was from Semizovci. I never saw him.

When I was freed, the five girls who were with me in the room were also released. Two of them committed suicide immediately after their release and the rest of them left the village with their parents. They set us free because we were pregnant and their purpose was to make us pregnant.

I am horrified of confined spaces and I wish to go back home as soon as possible.

Deposition recorded by

Zorica Stevic
Senior Stenographer
at the Federal Assembly

Deposition made by

S. K.

Deposition made by S. K. from Sarajevo, Belesici, on 23 November 1992 at the Gynaecology-Obstetrics Clinic in Belgrade

I was born 7 February 1972 in Sarajevo, where I lived until the outbreak of the war. When it broke out, I was taken to prison last April at the time when the roadblocks began to be set up.

I completed elementary school and the high hairdressers' course.

I worked in a private hairdresser's lounge, "Buba-Mara", and was a part-time student of the Faculty of Physical Education (I completed two years).

While I was returning home from my job, I was stopped by four armed members of the green berets who pushed me into a car, blindfolded me and drove me to a basement (I do not know where it was located). When we arrived there, I was put, together with a 16-year-old girl named Jelena, in a small partitioned corridor having no windows or ventilation.

On the first night, 12 men wearing black overalls, which served as a kind of their uniforms, came. They first molested Jelena and then forced themselves upon me. I did not know any of them; I only heard that they called one of them "Alibaba". He tore all my clothes and, since I was virgo in tacta, he was very brutal, he slapped me and made me have both oral sex with him and intercourse. Then the other two came who pinned me down on the floor while Ismet Bajramovic, known as Celo (I later found out what his name was), led the rape. He was the leader of the group. He has an organization of his own which still operates in Sarajevo. He assaulted me first, then the others took their turn and the whole ordeal was repeated throughout the night: I had to have oral sex and intercourse with them. I found out his name during my 25-day detention with Jelena in that corridor. Jelena stayed behind when I left. As I could see later on, it was a smaller apartment building which had a basement where the two of us were detained. The basement space next to us resounded with cries and screams of other women. During those 25 days I was there, I was repeatedly abused day in day out; both of us were forced to have oral sex and intercourse. All those who did that to us said that Serbs were doing the same to their Moslem sisters. This was their pretext, a justification for what they did.

On my last, 25th, day there, Ismet Bajramovic-Celo came and told me he had to let me go because of the strings pulled on my behalf, advising me to forget all about what happened to me there for my own sake.

The husband of a friend of mine, a Moslem, used his connections to find out where I was and get me out. He told me that the building I had been in was in Pofalici. Everything has been pulverized and there is no Serb house left in that suburb now.

I left in the same manner I was brought in - blindfolded. They drove me to Kosevsko Brdo, a Moslem-controlled sector of Sarajevo, opened the door and

threw me out. I walked to a friend, Emir Tufekcic, whose wife Radmila is a Serb.

Since I was mentally disturbed, my friend Emir Tufekcic, who was not a member of the green berets at the time but had to comply with a work order, and his wife Radmila helped me to go to the psychiatric clinic "Kosevo" in Kosevo, to see a Dr. Haris, whose surname I do not know. I found out what his name was while I was treated at the clinic: they called him Haris there. I was hospitalized for 28 days. Having left the clinic, I stayed with Emir and Radmila Tufekcic who hid me in their home.

After a month I felt sickness, I vomited, which indicated pregnancy. I went again to "Kosevo" clinic intending to have an abortion. They said that I could have it only if I said to the journalists that I was raped by Serbs. I indignantly refused, since I could not besmirch my people, the religion I belong to, and myself. They have no humanity or compassion; they salute each other with "Selam alekum and merhaba". So, I decided: if there was no chance for me to have an abortion, I would give birth to the child and strangle it. I hope one can understand such thoughts in such moments. The child was not a fruit of love; I would feel only hatred and rage for it and it would always remind me of the awful and horrible things I went through.

I was still with my friends Emir and Radmila Tufekcic, who fed me and gave me clothes, since I did not have any clothes of my own. There was no chance for me to pass to the Serb-controlled territory. I was with them until 15 November (midnight). They helped me to be included in the list of people to be evacuated to Serbia. The list began to be compiled in July, but it was not until November that the convoy of evacuees left for Serbia. The convoy departed Sarajevo on 15 November and reached Belgrade on 17 November 1992. I arrived in Belgrade at midnight, where I slept and a day later I was admitted to the Gynaecology-Obstetrics Clinic, where I gave birth.

Deposition taken by

Milica Dunic
Senior Stenographer
at the Federal Assembly

Deposition made by

S. K.

Belgrade, 24 November 1992

Deposition made by M. R. of her own accord

I was born on 16 March 1954, in the village of Visori on Mount Majevica and lived in the village of Brezje, also on Majevica. I am a peasant farmer.

At that time, my brother-in-law Drago was on the battlefront, and my husband too. We took our children to Sremska Mitrovica along with other children from our village.

It happened early in June, one afternoon. They simply raided the village of Brezje. It is a small village. They surrounded it. Three men stood outside each house so it was not possible to escape or step out for a single moment. They singled out 36 youngsters and took them away. Women and girls were divided into groups.

Some were raped outside their homes. Ljubomir of Gornje Brezje, I cannot remember his surname, killed himself because they raped his wife and daughter in front of his home. They classified men as well and left the elderly people, so that nothing is presently known of their fates, whether they are still alive or dead, and no one can reach them. My father and mother stayed behind. I do not know anything about them.

They took things out of houses, they even tore our doors and windows and transported them to Srebrnik. Later on, they set fire to the houses. I know that they first slaughtered Stokan Djukić and his wife Kata, who was Croatian. They were the first victims. The attackers were armed and wore greenish, patterned disguise uniforms. They also killed Stojan Djukić. They forced Ilija Mihajlović to dig up a hole for himself and then to cover it with earth again. Later on, they made a big wooden cross for him, fixed him alive onto it and left him like that.

Our village is a small one, so that no one could run away and the entire population was killed. We received no news that people escaped or at least saved their lives and property of any significance. They looted everything and burned whatever was left.

They separated women from men, put us into covered trucks, similar to vans, where there was no air, and took us to a camp. It was in the afternoon, I was wearing the blouse and a skirt that I had on at home. They took us to Tuzla; they put us into a tunnel, women only. It was dark inside, no light from anywhere. There were guards watching us and we were not even allowed to talk for fear of mistreatment.

I spent more than five months in the camp. We were exchanged some 10 days ago. There were two other elderly women from our village, Danica and Petra, who were also exchanged.

During all that time, five months, they never took us outside. They gave us food and a plastic bowl with water to drink. I still wore the same clothes in which I left the house. We could neither wash ourselves nor our clothes.

We were 10 women. There was a partition in the tunnel, but somewhere there was not. They separated girls from women. It is unimaginable what they did. I cannot even talk about it. When they came to rape us, they first blindfolded us, so that we could not recognize them. You could neither see who approached you nor what he was doing to you, to prevent you from perhaps recognizing your neighbour.

They changed one after the other, doing whatever they pleased. They came whenever they wanted; sometimes there were three on one woman. For this to happen it was enough to utter a word during mealtime. They asked me what caused me most pain and where my husband was. I could not say he was on the front, so I said I did not know. Then they said: "You do not know where he is? You are hiding him". Then they asked me where my children were. They knew I had a brother-in-law, Drago, and a husband, saying that they knew that they were on the opposite side. They joined the Army, they said, adding that they won't be able to do anything on that side. They will just die like the rest of the Serbs until they were so few that they can all sit at one dining-table. They wore camouflage uniforms and were disguised so as not to be recognized.

They said that Serbian women should no longer give birth to Serbian children, but to Moslem and Croatian. They did not allow me to be exchanged before my pregnancy was well advanced.

I thought a lot about everything, I even thought of suicide. Some people went insane and lost self-control, for not everyone can endure all those tortures. I wanted to kill myself, but the thought of my two children, whom I have to support because my husband is on the front, made me stop. They told me: "Milosevic will not be with you, we will put you on trial".

They did not want to take their own people who surrendered. There were dozens of them waiting to be exchanged, but they did not want them; they said - since they surrendered, you may do with them whatever you want, we do not need them.

All information about us, camp inmates, was obtained from our neighbours, inhabitants of the neighbouring Muslim village of Hunci. I never did any harm to anyone from that village. When the exchange was to be effected among myself, two other women and one man, they were asked who should be exchanged. There was a separate part of the camp for men. The man who was released with us was Nenad Kojo. His brother, Sima Kojo, remained in the camp. He told us that red-hot wire was pushed through his nose while he was forced to walk down the corridor and wherever there was a drop of blood, his brother had to lick it. That was the first exchange of prisoners from our camp. There were 17 Muslims to be exchanged for four of us. They blindfolded us again, put us in a van and took us to Sibosnica, where they left us. From Sibosnica to Piper we were driven in a car; there we were taken over by our crisis team. My village of Brezje is on the slopes of Mt. Majevica and belongs to the Municipality of Lopare. I have two children. My son was born in 1978 and my daughter in 1982. I suffer very much because I haven't seen them for six

months, nor have I fed them or given them anything to wear; I don't know how they are. My husband is on the front. I lost everything, but my relatives will take me here, and I will do any work anywhere in order to support my children.

Belgrade, 16 November 1992

Deposition made by
(Signed) M. R.

Stenographer: Roza Mitrović
Stenographer at the Federal Assembly

A testimony of a Serbian woman who was a slave in the brothel for Alija's warriors for more than five months

G. T., a 28-year-old housewife from the Serbian village of Blagaj near Kupres, spent more than five months besieged in a brothel at Livno and the "Ciglane" area in Sarajevo.

She is five months pregnant and wishes to abort the unwanted foetus at any expense. She is the mother of two girls: one is 11 and the other is 7 years old. Fortunately, she sent both daughters to her brother's in Belgrade. She was reluctant to leave without her husband, who was among the first in their village to join the JNA units.

At the beginning of April, early in the morning, her school friend from Kupres, Mensur Zujkić, appeared at the door followed by a group of armed men.

That April morning, Mensur Zujkić grabbed her like a wild beast, abused her, pulled her out of the house and without any explanation took her to Livno. From that morning she was in hell.

In a large, luxuriously equipped house at Livno, every morning G. had to serve as a source of pleasure to her schoolmate, thus paying the price of her seemingly happy youth.

There were other women in that house too, said G. Younger and older ones, ranging from 18 to 40. All of them were Serbian women, except one who was Ruthenian. When they brought me there, it seemed that they were already used to their misfortune and despair. None of them would even scream or cry. They accepted the soldiers bluntly, as if it were happening to someone else. I saw them rarely, but once, when I got permission to go outside to feel the sun, one of the women seriously scorned me: "Why are you complaining, necessity is a must when the devil drives. Your screams disturb us and those beasts as well, and then they abuse us longer. It then takes them longer. Persevere, be silent. God help us, they'll let us go." I feel like dying, when the doorknob turns. Lying on that bed I pray for death. It seemed to me that the attic was falling on top of us, as if it were cracking with my children and my husband peeping through and watching those shameful and obscene acts.

G. had to belong only to Mensur Zujkić. When he left Livno and went to Sarajevo in late June, he took her along. As the front moved, Zujkić dragged her as well all over Sarajevo, and finally put her to a brothel in the "Ciglane" area, where again she was only his property.

"Ciglane" is a dreadful place, G. remembers. Very young girls are there too. I could drop dead immediately from what I saw. Young girls stretched out with 7 to 8 Muslims taking their turns on them. I thought of my younger daughter. These girls were not older than 10 or 12 ... "Ciglane" had good security, so no one was allowed to made a sound.

The days which G. spent in the "Ciglane" area, where Alija's main military headquarters for the defence of Sarajevo are situated, seemed to have lasted forever. Drunk Croat and Muslim warriors and some "mercenaries" were coming in and out, firing on and off. They shouted: "We are making Serbian women bastards!" Like the one I now want to get rid of. I have to, G. said nervously.

God forgive me, this must have about five months, as if she were talking about cancer. If only someone would remove it ... If not, I'll get rid of it myself. I'm not even sure that "it" would be normal, considering everything I went through. I'm no longer normal either. Let only my and my husband's children be living and healthy, whatever may happen to me.

Brothels with Serb women established by Moslem and Croatian forces:

1. Sarajevo: "Zagreb" hotel, about 40 to 50 Serb women are placed in the cellars, and they are maltreated by members of the Moslem Territorial Defence of BH;

2. Sarajevo: "Bjelave" dormitory, about 30 women of Serbian nationality;

3. Sarajevo: "Zetra" Sports Centre, about 30 women of Serbian nationality;

4. Sarajevo: "Borsalino" cafe, about 10 women of Serbian nationality;

5. Sarajevo: District of "Ciglane", former premises of the "Djordjevic" firm, about 30 women of Serbian nationality;

6. Sarajevo: School of civil engineering, about 100 women of Serbian nationality; the manager of the brothel is Mirza Delibasic, a famous basketball player;

7. Hadzici: The village of Urduk near Pazaric, about 10 women of Serbian nationality;

8. Hadzici: Primary school in the village of Tarcin, about 50 women of Serbian nationality;

9. Tuzla: Secondary school premises, about 100 women of Serbian nationality;

10. Tuzla: Private house on the road towards Srebrenik, near Previla, about 15 women of Serbian nationality;

11. Bugojno: House of the killed Serb Relja Lukić, about 15 women of Serbian nationality;

12. Bugojno: "Rostovo" ski centre, about 30 women of Serbian nationality;

13. Konjic: In the village of Buturovic Polje, about 50 women of Serbian nationality;

14. Konjic: "Amadeus" cafe in the centre of the town, about 20 women of Serbian nationality;

15. Bihać: House owned and managed by Mustafa Vukovic, about 30 women of Serbian nationality.

Apart from these 15 brothels, on which we have gathered information and where about 800 women of Serbian nationality are being raped by members of the Moslem TD of BH and Croatian Army, an unprecedented terror of women and girls of Serbian nationality is carried out in all concentration camps for Serbs.

ANNEX II

Analysis of the medical-psychological examinations of one group of people released through the exchange of prisoners

I. INTRODUCTION

A team of experts from the Institute for Mental Health and Military Psychology at the Military Medical Academy, made up of two physicians-neuropsychiatrists and two psychologists, examined the whole group of people released through the exchange of prisoners. The group of 380 members of the Croatian paramilitary formations was returned in exchange for this group of 41 prisoners. The exchange took place on 27 March 1992, and the medical-psychological examinations were made on 28 March 1992.

Our purpose was both to establish their actual psycho-physical conditions and determine all the forms of brutal physical and mental treatment and violence on the basis of general medical examinations, semi-standardized psychological-psychiatric interviews and verbal statements of the prisoners examined.

II. BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC AND OTHER IMPORTANT DATA

All the prisoners from the group exchanged were of the average age of 48. The youngest was 24 and the oldest 73. There were 5 women with an average age of 44, out of which 4 were housewives and 1 an unqualified worker. Among the male members of the group, most of them were farmers, workers, pensioners, two technicians and one professor, among which 9 were members of the Armed Forces - 4 Territorial Defence members, 2 volunteers (aged 37 and 62), 2 reservists and 1 JNA Junior Officer. They were arrested between 6 November 1991 and 13 March 1992.

The circumstances under which these people were deprived of their liberty were different, ranging from those most common - in their houses while watching television, or in the streets - to even more unusual, on the highway, on their return from a wedding (R. P., aged 42) or on their way back to the village from the medical examination (B. C., aged 73 suffering from an ulcer). Some of them were ambushed by the Croatian Ministry of the Interior (B. B., aged 66) or captured in the field while gathering corn (K. T., aged 57) or plums (I. S., aged 56). The only one JNA member, a junior officer (Z. S., aged 49), a Serb, married to a Croatian woman, was arrested on his leave, while sleeping.

Almost all the prisoners, after being interrogated for 3 to 10 days in Vinkovci, Sisak, Slavonska Orahovica, Slavonska Požega, Podravska Slatina, Djakovo, Novska, Našice, etc., were taken to prisoner camps in Osijek or Zagreb (in Zagreb to Kerestinac and Gaj). The most brutal and cruel physical

and mental treatment by depriving them even of their basic physiological needs (water, food, sleep, movement) was committed during the "inquiry". Throughout their captivity, they were exposed to some more mild forms of physical, mental and social torture. Torturing continued even on the buses, on the way from the prison in Osijek to the determined point of exchange. That was testified by the cases of T. R., aged 32, and J. M., aged 55, who got fresh bloody swellings in the region of the right cheek-bone, i.e. lower jaw.

III. MOST FREQUENT FORMS OF PHYSICAL TREATMENT

Classification into physical and psychological, i.e. psycho-social, forms of treatment is of a relative character, because these forms cannot be easily distinguished, one from the others. Some of the most often forms of physical torture registered are:

- deprivation of basic physiological needs, for instance, leaving prisoners five days without water and food or forbidding them to relieve themselves while being tied to hot radiators (I. S., aged 56);

- hitting the heads of the prisoners against the wall until they faint (B. B., aged 66);

- beating with truncheons, wire ropes, butts of guns, broomsticks till the loss of consciousness;

- electrocution with electro shocks, electric wires tied to the wrists in the region of the neck, heavy thighs and even to the genitals;

- "coming to life" of fainted prisoners by brutal physical torture, for instance by pouring vinegar, brandy or even urine into the mouth;

- kicking prisoners with boots while lying on the concrete, blindfolded as not to see faces of their torturers;

- "demonstration" of gouging the eyes of Serbs by sticking fingers into the eye sockets;

- permanent jumping from a bench or a table onto the stomachs of the victims lied on their back on the concrete, until they get hernia (K. T., aged 53, with a hernia large as a human head; C. M., aged 42, with a bit smaller hernia);

- tying men with spread legs and beating them with truncheons on the genitals;

- raping of women with their arms and legs tied in a so-called "black room" for days (M. R., aged 38, lost 25 kg for three months);

- stripping them naked and beating them with boots, truncheons until they faint;

- extinguishing butts of cigarettes into the mouth of victims, forcing them to swallow them;

- swallowing extinguished butts previously plunged into urine;

- chaining the left arm to the left leg (Z. M., aged 43);

- trampling with both legs, fixing the neck with one leg and kicking in the region of the heart with the other one;

- plucking hair and forcing prisoners to eat it (J. N., aged 38);

- extracting teeth, mostly with a barrel of a revolver (two teeth: M. G., aged 42);

- nailing handcuffed prisoners to a fixed hook on a wall, then beating till the loss of consciousness and leaving them in a such position;

- trampling with boots upon the surgical scar from the operation for gastric ulcer (operated on 10 November, arrested on 30 December 1991, D. N., aged 38);

- putting bags over the head, roping around the neck, knocking down to the concrete and then savagely kicking with boots, truncheons, etc.;

- striking on the head with a big metal ladle of 1 m until they faint;

- striking with a "hammer" made of 1-2 kg salt folded in a sheet, knotted and plunged into water so as to gain in weight;

- tying to a tree, in winter at -15° C and watering prisoners in order to hasten their freezing;

- carrying bags full of sand from one side of the camp to the other without any reason under threats: "Who's told you to do that, take it back!", without any end to it;

- forcing to relieve themselves in the room where they sleep, on the floor because there are no buckets;

- forcing to take shower with cold and hot water alternately so as to suffer burns;

- tying the prisoners to a tree for two days and nights in snow in winter, depriving them of water and food and beating them (N. G., aged 35, permanently relieved from military duty because of illness);

- cutting ears with a knife and forcing prisoners to lick knives under threats of being slaughtered;

- carving the skin on the back with a knife and pouring salt in a wound;

- beating with steel cable on the bare feet;

- there is a case when torturers started to slaughter a prisoner (D. M., aged 42) when, by accident, he was saved by the Commander of the Ministry of the Interior, his school friend from the elementary school.

IV. MOST FREQUENT FORMS OF MENTAL ILL-TREATMENT

The forms of mental ill-treatment ranged from bullying, threats, blackmail, recruitment and humiliation to brutal maltreatment, homosexual and heterosexual abuse. We present herewith the most frequent forms of mental ill-treatment:

- putting the pistol barrel into the prisoner's mouth and a knife under his his neck threatening him that he would be "slaughtered as all members of his family had already been";

- prisoners were told that their children had been already slaughtered; that it was their turn; that that was the way of "solving the Chetniks problem";

- the prisoners were forced to cross themselves and to bow down with curses before the photo of S. Milošević;

- the prisoners were forced to masturbate before Tito's picture;

- "night dances" - the prisoners were forced to dance with the music turned on loudly and in the presence of drunken Ustashes. During the dance the male and female prisoners were half naked so to be "stimulated". Afterwards they went to the dark room where the torturers raped the young female prisoners, whose arms and legs were tied and stretched;

- the group of male prisoners was forced to masturbate in front of the half-naked older female prisoners. This was followed by the brutal verbal humiliation and music which add to the physical and psychological ill-treatment;

- the young female prisoners were forced to bathe in the morning and then to swallow the sperm of 10 to 20 Ustashes;

- the young male prisoner was requested to make oral sex on an older male person;

- anal heterosexual intercourse with a victim who was then forced to make oral sex and to swallow the sperm;

- group masturbation; then a wife of one prisoner was forced to make oral sex on a prisoner while her husband was watching;

- "special dance" - naked male and female prisoners were forced to dance permanently for 4 to 5 hours until completely exhausted and then they underwent the "process of reanimation";

- "games without frontiers" - the prisoners were carrying plates with hot water on their heads and then forced to run so that the water could splash out and cause the burns;

- the prisoner was requested to write a statement, several pages long and then to eat it (C. M., 44 years old);

- a prisoner was made to move on his knees and elbows while another one was riding him. While doing this they had to repeat permanently: "Živjela vječna Hrvatska" (Long live the everlasting Croatia!) but if they pronounced the word "živjela" in a different way (like "živila" or "živela") they underwent additional ill-treatment;

- the prisoners were questioned: "Who is the Croat?" The answer was: "Sir". "Who is the Serb?" - "The gypsy";

- the prisoners were shown the tapes with the massacred wounded persons and corpses in order to see "what Chetniks do to the Croats";

- the prisoners were made to sing some new songs like "Milan Martić, the son of a bitch";

- the prisoners were requested to say the evening prayer: "Mother of Lord, the Serbian vagina wishes you good night ...";

- "riddles": How can you hold your ears with one hand? The answer: "This can be done if an Ustasha cut one of your ears and put it in your hand";

- deliberate exposure to death (O. N., 37 years old, together with other prisoners, was sent into the streets of Osijek to collect the garbage while vigorous combat was in course. The Ustashas with snipers watched them in order to prevent them from finding shelter);

- the prisoners were put in chains and taken from one restaurant to another presented as "Milošević's Chetniks";

- while grinding the bullet in front of the prisoner (J. N., 51 years old) the torturer explained that the death would be easier for him;

- the prisoner (M. C., 33 years old) was forced to sing "Lily Marlene".

V. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ILL-TREATMENT

By the medical check-up we found the following: fresh blood bruises on lower jaw, cheek-bones, hand, wrists where there were also scars made by hanging the victims with handcuffs on their hands on hooks fixed in the wall, scars on the hand, wrists, necks and legs made by electric devices.

Difficulties in opening the mouth were also registered as the prisoner's broken jaw was not treated medically (T. M., 38 years old). In fact, this prisoner refused the surgery intervention in Zagreb for fear of being killed. Two large hernias were found caused by the ill-treatment as described in the above text. The patients suffer from pains in the chest, they expectorate lymph, there are traces of blood in their urine and stool. There are visible scars on the forehead and other parts of the prisoners' heads which are obviously the result of cuts made by a sharp object. The patients complained of pains in the back, chest, breasts and wrists.

The most prominent mental discomforts were: insomnia, increased sweating, emotional disturbance, anxiety, fear, nightmares with permanent reminiscences of experienced and seen trauma scenes, apathy, crying mood, lack of appetite, arrhythmia, psycho-motoric disturbance, headaches, feeling that it was impossible to breathe, anxious and depressive reactions with all female patients.

The persons that underwent the medical check-up expressed, although they had been exposed to prolonged strong stress situations and humiliation, mature consideration for their own state and unexpected mental resistance to intensity and duration of stress events. Some of them expressed even some sort of pride that they "did not knuckle under pressure". Some of the patients were given the necessary medicaments and it was suggested that they undergo other necessary medical treatment. We must point out that the medical check-ups were completed in the morning hours some 15 hours after the exchange. Owing to this fact it is possible to expect some delayed reactions to stress as post-trauma stress disturbance. Because of this it is necessary to continue with following the psychological adaptability of the patients as well as to undertake available mental-hygiene and medical measures.

VI. CONCLUSION

The analysis of the medical and psychological check-ups of one group of prisoners released by exchange exposed the fact that those individuals had been exposed to severe physical torture, ill-treatment and criminal activities.

The psychological ill-treatment was directed at destroying the motivation regarding safety, self-confidence and affiliation. At the same time the torturers tried to develop with the prisoners the feeling of uncertainty, helplessness, fear, anxiety and even the feeling of losing one's own identity.

Social pressure was directed at degradation of personality by destroying basic human dignity. The characteristics of the psycho-social ill-treatment were animal hatred against the victim, sadism up to bestiality and extreme cruelty.

We consider such treatment of prisoners as a crime against humanity and that it is necessary to inform the domestic and international public of this fact so as to observe all this in the light of international war law and conventions regarding prisoners of war and victims of war in general.

We suggest that a medical check-up of other groups of released prisoners be done, especially of the Armed Forces personnel, by the team of doctors - forensic specialists, neuro-psychiatrists and psychologists.

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992. In those paragraphs, the Security Council:

> "Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;
>
> Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command".

2. Section I of the present report contains a factual description of the action taken up to 18 December 1992 to implement resolution 794 (1992). I had intended to include in that section a report on the military operations of the unified command (now referred to as the "Unified Task Force"). However, on 17 December 1992, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America sent a letter to the President of the Security Council containing a report "on the activities of the Unified Task Force directed towards the implementation of that resolution." The letter has been circulated as document S/24976.

3. Section II sets out my current thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force to continued peace-keeping operations.

4. My observations are contained in section III.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

5. The specific mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concerned:

(a) The operations of UNOSOM (para. 6);

(b) Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (para. 10);

(c) Establishment of a fund for contributions (para. 11);

(d) Establishment of mechanisms for coordination (para. 13), including the attachment of a UNOSOM liaison staff to the headquarters of the Unified Task Force (para. 15);

(e) Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (para. 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

A. The operations of the United Nations Operation in Somalia

6. UNOSOM's military component currently has a strength of 564 all ranks, composed mainly of a 500-strong battalion, 50 military observers, movement-and-logistics elements and a small headquarters staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, on 18 December 1992, on the advice of my Special Representative and the Force Commander, I authorized the deployment of about 100 additional personnel to strengthen UNOSOM's headquarters.

7. The main activities currently carried out by the UNOSOM military component are as follows:

(a) UNOSOM has deployed two companies of its infantry battalion to Mogadishu international airport, where they are working with the Unified Task Force to maintain security;

(b) Movement control is provided for United Nations flights at the airport;

(c) Escorts are provided for all UNOSOM personnel;

(d) A liaison team has been deployed to Unified Task Force headquarters, in accordance with paragraph 15 of resolution 794 (1992);

(e) Food convoys are escorted within the city of Mogadishu.

B. Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

8. As stated above, a report by the United States authorities has been circulated in document S/24976.

9. With the deployment of the Unified Task Force, the United Nations and other relief organizations are expected to implement fully their humanitarian programmes. They will also extend humanitarian assistance to areas which hitherto have been inaccessible due to security constraints. In that context, UNOSOM will enhance its capacity to discharge fully its coordination responsibilities as well as to take the lead in extending relief assistance to all parts of Somalia.

C. Establishment of a fund for contributions

10. The fund requested by the Security Council in paragraph 11 of resolution 794 (1992) has been established by the Secretariat and is to be known as the "Trust Fund for Somalia - Unified Command". An initial target figure has been set at $400 million. A general appeal for voluntary contributions has been issued to all Member States by the Controller. I am coordinating my fund-raising efforts with the Governments of Japan and the United States, which are working in partnership to ensure that we attain our goal. This active fund-raising campaign will include special appeals to heads of State and Government of selected countries. As of 18 December 1992, pledges to the Fund have been made as follows:

	$
Finland	700 000
Japan	100 000 000
Philippines	5 000
Saudi Arabia	10 000 000
Total	110 705 000

Saudi Arabia is also contributing troops to the Unified Task Force. I shall keep the Security Council informed on further developments.

D. Mechanisms for coordination

11. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

(a) At United Nations Headquarters:

(i) A policy group on Somalia, chaired by the Secretary-General. This group currently meets twice or three times a week and at least once a week with senior representatives of the United States Government to review the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding and planning for the future role of UNOSOM and the transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

(ii) An operational task force (chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan), comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned. This group meets at least once a day and representatives of the United States attend its meetings several times a week;

(iii) A cell in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations which maintains contact with UNOSOM 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

(b) At UNOSOM headquarters, Mogadishu:

(i) My Special Representative, Mr. Kittani, and the Force Commander, General Shaheen, are working closely with the Commander of the Unified Task Force, General Johnson, and with the United States Special Envoy, Ambassador Oakley, in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two forces. Much of the detailed planning of the eventual transition to peace-keeping operations will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose;

(ii) A small UNOSOM liaison staff has been attached to Unified Task Force headquarters, as already described above, and has secure communications with United Nations Headquarters.

12. Several of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have asked to participate in discussions with myself and my staff about the current operations of the Force and planning for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations. I am therefore initiating regular meetings to which all States participating in the Force will be invited.

E. Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

13. Since the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), I have continued my efforts to achieve a political settlement, believing it essential that such efforts should proceed in parallel with the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia. Progress on the political front is a necessary condition for the United Nations to be able to assist Somalia in launching the economic and social programmes for rehabilitation and reconstruction which will be needed to support post-conflict peace-building. In a letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush, I described my vision of a division of labour between the United Nations and the United States in the following terms:

> "The United States has undertaken to take the lead in creating the secure environment which is an inescapable condition for the United Nations to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and economic reconstruction, objectives which have from the outset been included in the various Security Council resolutions on Somalia."

14. As soon as resolution 794 (1992) was adopted, I communicated its text to the Secretaries-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the League of Arab States. These regional organizations have been associated, with the United Nations, in efforts to promote national reconciliation in Somalia. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kittani, was requested to inform political parties and movements in Somalia of the implications of the adoption of the resolution. He has remained in close contact with the parties and movements.

15. The results of the technical meeting between the United Nations and various Somali groups at Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992 were encouraging. Taking this into account, as well as advice from my Special Representative and appeals from the Somali parties, I have decided to initiate the process of national reconciliation during the first phase of action by the Unified Task Force. Accordingly, I am convening an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity on Somalia, to be held at United Nations headquarters in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993.

16. The objective of this informal meeting is to prepare a framework that will enable the Somali people themselves to develop ideas and suggest arrangements for the formation of a government in accordance with their own traditions and values. Looking ahead to the convening of a national reconciliation conference, the meeting will seek consensus on the date, venue and list of participants for such a formal conference. If possible, the meeting will prepare a draft agenda for the conference.

17. In the meantime, and only for this informal meeting, the Special Representative, as a result of his consultations with Somalis at the local level, has proposed a list of 12 Somali political movements to be invited to the informal meeting on 4 January 1993. The 12 movements are:

(1) Somali Salvation Democratic front (SSDF)

(2) Somali National Movement (SNM)

(3) Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)

(4) United Somali Congress (USC) - Ali Mahdi

(5) Somali National Front (SNF)

(6) United Somali Party (USP)

(7) Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)

(8) United Somali Front (USF)

(9) Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

(10) Somali Agricultural Muki Organization (SAMO)

(11) Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)

(12) United Somali Congress (USC) - Aidid

18. I have extended invitations to the informal meeting to these 12 Somali political movements, as well as to the Secretaries-General of OAU, OIC and the League of Arab States and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn. It is also my intention to invite the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to be represented. I plan to visit the countries of the Horn, tentatively including Somalia, during the first part of January of 1993 to give further impetus to the process of national reconciliation.

II. THE FUTURE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA AND THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSITION TO CONTINUED PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

19. Paragraph 1 of resolution 794 (1992) encapsulates the mandate which the Security Council has entrusted to the Secretary-General since it adopted resolution 733 (1992) on 23 January 1992. This mandate has been to help the parties to establish and maintain a cease-fire, to distribute humanitarian relief and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement. In resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 the Council took the further step of agreeing in principle to establish a security force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu. In resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 the Council decided to extend this mandate to cover other areas in Somalia. It was to be implemented, as originally stipulated in paragraph 5 of resolution 751 (1992), in consultation with the parties concerned. In practice, fulfilment of that condition proved to be impossible. The agreement

of "the parties" could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations forces in areas where the protection of humanitarian operations was most desperately needed; when agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in Mogadishu was agreed was not large enough to control the increasingly violent and lawless situation in that city.

20. My new Special Representative, Mr. Ismat Kittani, took up his duties in Mogadishu on 8 November 1992. His initial reports, which I summarized in my letter of 24 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24859), described graphically the obstacles which UNOSOM was facing. I accordingly suggested in that letter that the time might have come when it was necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia. The following afternoon I was informed that if the Security Council were to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate. The Council responded promptly and positively to these initiatives and adopted resolution 794 (1992) in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In the same resolution the Council stated the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable it to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

21. The present position is thus that the Security Council, having accepted my advice that the traditional peace-keeping model was not suitable to the Somali situation, and acting under Chapter VII, has entrusted to certain Member States, on a temporary basis, the responsibility of creating a secure environment for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is the wish of the Security Council that the transition back to peace-keeping operations should be achieved promptly. It is therefore of great importance that the conditions for such a transition should be achieved as soon as possible.

22. Since resolution 794 (1992) was adopted, I and senior members of my staff have had a number of meetings with representatives of the United States Government to discuss, inter alia, how and when the transition to continued peace-keeping operations could be made. In these discussions I have laid emphasis on two conditions in particular, whose importance I also stressed in a letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush.

23. The first condition is that the Unified Task Force should take effective action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed before the Unified Task Force withdraws. In my letter to President Bush I referred to this need, and continued:

> "As I stated in my letter of 29 November to the President of the Security Council, any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed. Without this action I do not believe that it will be possible to establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution or to create conditions in which the United Nations existing efforts to promote national reconciliation can be carried forward and the task of protecting humanitarian activities can safely be transferred to a conventional United Nations peace-keeping operation."

24. The fulfilment of this condition demands action on two fronts. First, it is necessary to establish or consolidate agreements with the leaders of all the organized factions for effective cease-fires in the various conflicts between them. These agreements must include provisions for the concentration of all the heavy weapons of each faction at designated locations where they can be brought under international control, exercised initially by the Unified Task Force and thereafter by UNOSOM. I am glad to be able to report that the leaders of the two principal factions in Mogadishu have recently agreed to a new cease-fire and to the concentration of their weapons. It is important that this agreement be quickly implemented and become the model for similar agreements elsewhere in Somalia.

25. Secondly, it is necessary to disarm the lawless gangs who have been the principal threat to humanitarian operations. In their armament and mode of operation (as described in my letter of 29 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24868)) they are little different from the forces of the organized factions and, indeed, sometimes cooperate with them. Once the heavy weapons of the organized factions have been concentrated, all other heavy weapons should in my view be confiscated and destroyed during the Unified Task Force's stay in the country.

26. Unless effective action is taken on these two fronts, the international community's efforts to help the people of Somalia will continue to be at risk from civil war and the predation of heavily armed and lawless gangs. The necessary secure environment for humanitarian operations and the promotion of a political settlement, in accordance with resolution 794 (1992), would not be established. In such circumstances I would not be in a position to recommend to the Council that it decide to make the transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

27. There remains the question of small arms held by individuals. Somalia has for long been a society in which it is normal for individuals to bear arms. However, the number of weapons held, and their calibres, have increased greatly in recent years, as a result of the vast influx of arms into the country during the cold war and developments in neighbouring countries, to the extent that they have become a standing threat to the maintenance of law and order. It will be for a new Somali Government to determine laws and regulations on the bearing of arms by individuals, and those laws and

regulations will be enforced by a new police force. Meanwhile, I believe it important that the Unified Task Force and thereafter UNOSOM should do all they can to induce individuals to hand in their weapons in order to foster a more secure environment.

28. It is also important that the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM should begin the task of clearing mines and other munitions, especially where these prevent the use of roads, bridges and other facilities required for the efficient distribution of humanitarian supplies. This is a particular problem in the north.

29. The second, and equally essential, condition is that the authority entrusted to the Unified Task Force should be exercised throughout Somalia. Paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992) imposes no geographical limitation, other than "in Somalia", on the mandate it confers and there are many other passages in the resolution (especially its paragraph 1) which show that "in Somalia" should be interpreted to mean the whole of the country. I raised this point too in my letter of 8 December to President Bush, in which I wrote:

> "I believe it essential that the purpose of the new operation should be to create a secure environment throughout Somalia and that this should be apparent from the outset. It is true that the quantity of suffering is greatest in the areas where it is planned to deploy the unified command's forces in the first phases. But qualitatively the situation is just as bad elsewhere, especially in the north. I was therefore heartened to hear that the unified command is studying how the new operation could be extended to all parts of Somalia."

In addition to the humanitarian argument for country-wide deployment of the Unified Task Force, there is also a compelling security argument. The objectives of the Unified Task Force would not have been achieved, nor the conditions created for the transition to peace-keeping operations, if heavy weapons and lawless gangs simply withdrew from parts of Somalia controlled by the Unified Task Force to continue their action in other parts while waiting to return and resume their harassment and exploitation of the international relief effort after the Unified Task Force had handed over control to a less numerous and powerful United Nations force.

30. A third, if somewhat longer-term, factor is the need to create a new, professional police force. I am studying how this might be done, both politically and technically. It is clear that considerable financial, material and technical help will be required from the international community to establish a neutral police force. There have already been some helpful offers from Member States in this regard and I am pursuing them.

31. My discussions with the United States authorities have also touched on the revised mandate which the Security Council might entrust to a new UNOSOM. The mission's military mandate has to date been to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to provide security for United Nations humanitarian activities there and elsewhere in Somalia (para. 22 of my report of 21 April 1992

(S/23829) and paras. 23-26 of my report of 24 August 1992 (S/24480), which were approved by resolutions 751 (1992) and 775 (1992) respectively). It is clear that this mandate will have to be enlarged in conceptual and other terms when UNOSOM takes over from the Unified Task Force.

32. My current view is that the mandate would need to continue to cover the whole territory of Somalia and to include the following tasks, which are based on the assumption that during its presence in Somalia the Unified Task Force will have brought about an effective cessation of hostilities throughout the country and will have established the secure environment called for in resolution 794 (1992):

(a) To monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other military arrangements to which they will have agreed during the Unified Task Force's presence in the country;

(b) To prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against a faction which violates, or threatens to violate, the cessation of hostilities;

(c) To maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control by the Unified Task Force, pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army;

(d) To maintain security at all ports and airports required for delivery of humanitarian assistance;

(e) To protect, as required, warehouses, distribution centres and convoys of United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements which attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;

(f) To continue a programme for de-mining in the most afflicted areas;

(g) To provide, as requested, advice on, and technical assistance to, the formation of a police force and a new national army;

(h) To carry out such other functions as may subsequently be authorized by the Security Council.

33. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate would, to an important extent, depend upon the success of the Unified Task Force in establishing a secure environment throughout Somalia before it withdrew, and cannot therefore be estimated at this early stage of its operations. My recommendation to the Council is likely to be that the initial deployment should be rather substantial, in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security established by the Unified Task Force, but that it should be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new national army and police force become operational.

34. I and my colleagues have agreed with our United States interlocutors that there must be a smooth transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM without any hiatus which could be exploited by factions or gangs to compromise the secure environment created by the Unified Task Force. UNOSOM will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over instantly from the Unified Task Force in each area from which it withdraws. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area; it could not be implemented throughout the country on a single day.

35. A number of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have expressed to the United States authorities and/or to me a willingness for their contingents to serve eventually in UNOSOM. I welcome these offers and will present recommendations to the Security Council on the national composition of the new UNOSOM as soon as it is possible to determine its resource requirements. In formulating such recommendations I shall take into account the established criteria which the Security Council has endorsed in the past, including the necessary regional and political balance, military capacity and previous peace-keeping experience. Subject to these criteria, it will be my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in the new UNOSOM as many contingents as possible which will already be in Somalia serving under the command of the Unified Task Force. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of the Unified Task Force to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to in the preceding paragraph.

36. Any resources required by the new UNOSOM which cannot, for one reason or another, be made available from units already serving with the Unified Task Force will need to be deployed to Somalia in good time for the planned transition. In this context I am particularly concerned about the logistic units which will be required. It is my understanding that the bulk of the logistic support for the Unified Task Force will be provided by the United States. Logistic units are always the most difficult to find when a new peace-keeping operation is being put together. I have therefore indicated to the United States authorities that they are likely to be asked to keep some logistic units in Somalia in support of UNOSOM for some time after the main body of their troops has been withdrawn.

37. My and my colleagues' discussions with the United States authorities have been useful in clarifying many points and establishing much common ground about the modalities for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations. However, they have brought to light certain differences of approach as regards the timing of detailed planning for the transition. The United States representatives have pressed for such planning to begin now. I and my representatives, on the other hand, have taken the line that it would be difficult to move from discussion of concepts to the formulation of concrete plans until more is known about the success of the Unified Task Force in establishing a secure environment which would permit the transition to take

place. I have also had in mind the effect, positive or negative, that the evolution of the political process can have on the security environment. It is to be hoped that this factor will become easier to assess after the meeting which is to be held at Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993.

38. At the most recent meeting with United States representatives, which took place on 18 December 1992, it also became clear that their thinking differed somewhat from the concept described in the preceding paragraphs of the present report. They envisaged the Unified Task Force being replaced by a new UNOSOM which would be under United Nations command and control but whose mandate, concept of operations, level of armament and rules of engagement would be little different from those of the Unified Task Force itself. It was argued that a force mandated and organized on normal peace-keeping lines would not be capable of protecting humanitarian activities from factional forces or gangs which would not have been neutralized or disarmed during the presence of the Unified Task Force in Somalia. The United States representatives hoped that the transition from the Unified Task Force to this new UNOSOM could begin as soon as possible. My representatives undertook to convey this new approach to me and to consider whether joint planning could proceed on this basis.

III. OBSERVATIONS

39. In paragraph 19 of resolution 794 (1992) the Security Council asked me to "submit a plan ... to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command". Section II of the present report sets out my current ideas on the kind of mandate UNOSOM would require to maintain the secure environment for humanitarian relief operations which will have been established by the Unified Task Force. It also sets out my ideas on the conditions which will have to be fulfilled before I would feel able to recommend to the Security Council that it make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations. To that extent, the present report can be regarded as a conceptual plan for UNOSOM's new tasks after the Unified Task Force has completed the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992).

40. It will obviously be necessary to convert the conceptual plan into a specific plan detailing the troops and equipment required for UNOSOM, their deployment, arrangements for their logistic support, their rules of engagement and so on. Once these details are established it will be possible to work out quickly how the transition to continued peace-keeping operations can be put into effect. I share the United States authorities' wish that this work should be undertaken as soon as possible. But in my view the moment for it has not yet come. The Unified Task Force has been on the ground for only 10 days and it is too soon to make an evaluation of its success in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian operations and of the resources that will be required to enable UNOSOM to maintain that environment. At this stage, therefore, I am not in a position to offer the Council a specific and concrete plan for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

41. By the same token it is too soon to take a decision on the approach described in paragraph 38 above. This differs from the peace-keeping model by which I have so far been guided in accordance with resolution 794 (1992). It reflects a view that the Unified Task Force will not establish a secure environment of a kind that could be maintained by a normally mandated and armed peace-keeping force and that a considerable capacity for enforcement will therefore have to be kept in existence under United Nations command. This concept would require a further decision by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and would be analogous to the fifth option for which I expressed a preference in my letter of 29 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council.

42. The question which will have to be addressed in due course is whether such an operation would be feasible, taking into account the considerations referred to in that letter. To answer that question it will be necessary to know much more about the extent and success of the Unified Task Force's operations. It will also be necessary to know how many Member States, those already contributing to the Unified Task Force or others, would be ready to participate in an operation of this kind and whether their number would be sufficient for the task proposed.

43. There are wider reasons, extending beyond the success of the Unified Task Force or the readiness of Member States to support a peace enforcement operation under United Nations command, which lead me to conclude that it would be premature to determine at this stage how and when the Unified Task Force should be replaced. For the United Nations that decision will have very far-reaching consequences. Resolution 794 (1992) commits it to taking on another major peace-keeping operation at a time when both the Organization's capacity to manage such operations and Member States' readiness to finance them have been stretched almost to the limit by the huge expansion in peace-keeping in 1992. The approach described in paragraph 38 above presents an even more daunting prospect, namely the first peace-enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command. Whichever of these two options the Security Council may eventually choose, the Secretary-General has to do what he can to ensure, before decisions are taken, that conditions exist which offer a reasonable prospect of the operation succeeding. One of these conditions is confidence in continuing support from Member States, upon whom that success would be critically dependent.

44. In addressing these questions, I am conscious not only of the overriding humanitarian imperative but also of the interrelationship between the political process and security. Without improved security the political process cannot prosper. But there is little prospect of a sustained improvement in security unless the political process does prosper. A number of the factors identified in the present report as being relevant to the establishment of a secure environment will be strengthened if momentum can be maintained in the political process, just as they will be weakened if momentum is lost. Examples are the establishment of cease-fires, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs, the creation of a new police force. Without for one moment suggesting that the Unified Task Force should remain in

Somalia until the peace process achieves its goals, I do believe that progress in the peace process must be taken into account in deciding how and when the Force should be replaced by a new UNOSOM. The informal meeting over which I shall preside at Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993 is of special importance in this regard.

45. Another consideration underlining what may seem an over-cautious approach is the fact that the international community faces a long haul in helping the people of Somalia to put their country on its feet again. There will have to be an integrated approach towards the restoration of security, political reconciliation, the re-creation of institutions, the return of refugees, rehabilitation, reconstruction - in short, all the elements of post-conflict peace-building. Hasty decisions at the very beginning of this process could have far-reaching and nefarious consequences. It would be a tragedy if the premature departure, or remodelling, of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation and destroy the fragile political progress of recent weeks.

46. For all these reasons, I recommend that the Security Council defer a decision on these questions until the situation on the ground in Somalia becomes clearer.

47. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to the United States of America for the leadership which it has shown in its response to the crisis in Somalia. In my letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush I wrote:

> "I wish to express my appreciation for the significant contribution which the United States, under your leadership, is making to this endeavour. I should also like to assure you of my full commitment, and that of my Special Representative, Mr. Ismat Kittani, to working as closely as possible with you to ensure that together we can succeed in relieving the appalling suffering in Somalia and putting that country on course to a peaceful and more secure future".

The frankness with which, in the present report, I have described certain differences of approach between the Secretariat and the United States is a measure of the excellent working relationship that has been established between us since the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), both in New York and in Mogadishu. That close cooperation will continue. Equally, I pay tribute to the more than 20 Member States from all continents that have decided to participate in the Unified Task Force and to those that have contributed, or will contribute, to the Trust Fund which has been established to support the Force.

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S/24993
21 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the latter's note of 26 October 1992, has the honour to convey the following information.

The Central Bank of Iraq maintains an account with a value of US$ 48.88 million at the Bank of Tokyo. This amount represents proceeds from the sale of petroleum. However, as the entire contents of this account are subject to or satisfy the rights of a third party, there are no funds left in Japan to transfer to the escrow account provided for under Security Council resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1992).

With respect to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 778 (1992), there are no petroleum or petroleum products owned by the Government of Iraq, or its state bodies, cooperations or agencies in Japan.

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21 December 1992
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NOTE VERBALE DATED 17 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF COLOMBIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with regard to his note dated 26 October 1992, has the honour to inform him that Colombia, through the Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (ECOPETROL), has not imported any crude oil from Iraq.

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Security Council

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21 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to your note of 26 October 1992 concerning implementation of Security Council resolution 778 (1992).

The United Kingdom Government is currently in the process of adopting the legislation necessary in order to be able to identify the funds specified in resolution 778 (1992). I will inform you what Iraqi assets held in the United Kingdom, if any, are subject to the terms of that resolution as soon as the information becomes available.

(Signed) D. H. A. HANNAY

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21 December 1992

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LETTER DATED 18 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to address you, and through you the members of the Security Council, about the situation in Angola.

On 30 November 1992 the Security Council adopted resolution 793 (1992) by which it requested me to submit by 31 January 1993 my longer-term recommendations for the future role of the United Nations in the peace process in Angola. I regret to have to report to the Council that since that date there has been little or no progress in putting the peace process back on track. Unless there is a rapid improvement in this state of affairs, it is difficult to believe that by the end of next month conditions will exist for me to recommend to the Security Council that it authorize the enlarged United Nations presence in Angola which both sides say they want.

The Security Council's adoption of resolution 793 (1992) had been preceded by a favourable development. Four days before, on 26 November, senior delegations from the two sides had met under UNAVEM auspices in Namibe, the first such meeting since the tragic events of 31 October/1 November in Luanda and elsewhere. The atmosphere of that meeting was good and the two sides agreed on a declaration in which they pledged themselves to full acceptance of the validity of the Bicesse Accords, to an effective cease-fire throughout the country and the immediate cessation of all offensive movements, and to the need for a larger United Nations involvement. It was intended to resume the meeting a few days later.

However, this progress received an almost immediate setback when, on 29 November, UNITA forces took the northern cities of Uige and Negage, the latter being the site of an important airbase. As the members of the Council are aware, a United Nations police observer died in the cross-fire in Uige. Since then all attempts to restore a dialogue between the two sides have failed. UNITA forces were largely, but not entirely, withdrawn from Uige and Negage on 4 December, after strenuous efforts by UNAVEM II. But UNITA forces continue to occupy up to two-thirds of the municipalities in Angola, which the Government administration has had to leave or has been expelled. There is disturbing evidence that both sides are continuing their preparations for a

resumption of war on a large scale, and the Government's public statements speak openly of this possibility. In recent days, however, there has been a welcome reduction in the frequency of armed clashes.

On the political front, the Government announced, on 2 December, the formation of a Government of National Unity headed by Mr. Marcolino Moco, formerly Secretary-General of the governing party. The Government consists of 27 ministers and state secretaries. Of these 27 posts, one (Minister of Cultural Affairs) was offered to UNITA, together with four vice-ministerial posts (defence, agriculture, public works and social assistance). One ministerial post and six lesser positions were offered to other parties which had won seats in the new Assembly.

At a meeting of the Permanent Committee of its Political Commission on 8 and 9 December, UNITA decided to take up its seats in the Assembly and to nominate persons to occupy the posts which it had been offered in the Government. UNITA also decided to return its Generals to the structures of the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), from which they had withdrawn shortly after the elections of 29/30 September. These were positive moves which raised hopes that a political dialogue could be resumed and agreement be reached on a programme of action to complete the implementation of the Bicesse Accords.

Unfortunately, those hopes have not yet been fulfilled. Recriminations continue between the two sides on a variety of issues: the situation in Uige and Negage; UNITA's refusal to withdraw its troops and its resistance to the restoration of Government administration in municipalities which it has seized since the elections; the release of persons held by each side, in particular the senior UNITA personalities living "under Government protection" in Luanda; the exchange of bodies of those killed in the recent fighting; and mutual accusations of preparations for war.

A further obstacle to progress is UNITA's legitimate concern about the security of its members in Luanda and other government-controlled parts of the country. This is a matter for which both sides would like the United Nations to assume responsibility. While it would be difficult for the United Nations to do so directly, a number of ideas have been offered to the two sides and, if certain conditions were fulfilled, I would be ready to seek the Council's authority to make some United Nations military personnel available, on a temporary basis, to facilitate the return to Luanda of Dr. Savimbi, the UNITA members of the new Government and the UNITA members of the elected Assembly. I have accordingly instructed my Special Representative to try to engage the two sides in discussions of practical arrangements which would be acceptable to both of them and which I could recommend to the Council.

Both sides have recently conveyed to my Special Representative their ideas about the role which they would like the United Nations to play in future. Both agree in principle on the need to enlarge UNAVEM II's mandate and increase its strength on the ground, including the provision of armed troops. However, differences exist between them, especially on the extent to which UNAVEM II should in future exercise a good offices or mediatory

function, and the extent to which it should be involved in the organization and conduct of the second round of presidential elections.

I have continued to maintain the position that I would be ready to recommend to the Security Council that it authorize a larger mandate and strength for UNAVEM II but that I could only do this if the two sides had demonstrated their continuing commitment to the Bicesse Accords by agreeing on a realistic plan of action to get the implementation process back on track. As will be evident from this letter, they have so far failed to satisfy these conditions.

In these circumstances, I decided to telephone President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi on 12 December and ask them to meet together, under my auspices and in my presence, in Geneva during the last week of December in order to make a determined effort to move forward. President dos Santos said, as he has said before, that he would be willing to meet Dr. Savimbi, but that the meeting would have to take place in Angola's capital city, Luanda. Dr. Savimbi expressed readiness to attend a meeting in Geneva as I had proposed. In my conversation with President dos Santos, I expressed understanding of the reasons which had so far led him to insist on a meeting in Luanda. But I urged him to take into account the critical situation in his country and the danger that unless the two sides produce early evidence of their willingness and ability to work together to implement the Bicesse Accords, the international community will no longer feel justified in committing scarce resources to the continuation of the United Nations operation in Angola on its present scale.

I have thought it right, Mr. President, to bring this worrying situation to the Security Council's attention now and not wait until the report which I am required to provide towards the end of next month. I would value any support which the Council might wish to give to my efforts, perhaps in the form of an appeal to both leaders to accept my invitation to a joint meeting in Geneva or, if this were preferred, in another United Nations location such as Addis Ababa.

I should be grateful if you would bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI